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Abstract
In this paper we examine information privacy from a value-centered an-
gle. We review and compare different personal data valuation approaches.
We consider the value of personal data now and in the near future, and
we find that the enduring part of personal data will soon become common
knowledge and that their price and value will drop substantially. There-
fore the sector that is based on personal data extraction will need to focus
on new ways of monetization and on the of the dynamic part of personal
information.
Keywords: Privacy, price of privacy, value of privacy, personal data,
social networking
1 Introduction
In a classical definition privacy is a special case of a right to be let alone [WB90].
In the Random House Unabridged Dictionary privacy is the state of being free
from unwanted or undue intrusion or disturbance in one’s private life or affairs;
freedom to be let alone. Tavani distinguishes between three types of privacy
[Tav11]: (a) Accessibility (related with physical space), (b) decisional (right to
make decisions freely), and (c) informational privacy, the latter being defined as
control over the flow of one’s personal information. According to EU Regulation
2016/679 the protection of natural persons in relation to the processing of per-
sonal data is a fundamental right, where “personal data” means any information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. Of particular importance
are the sensitive personal data, which are personal data revealing racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union member-
ship, and data concerning health or sex life.
In this paper, we explore the privacy protection problem, both for online
social networks and generic e-service systems, from a value-centered angle.
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2 Value is created by using personal data
2.1 Value of personal data and value of services
There is a realm of apps and services, which includes social networking, that
are provided for “free,” subject to user consent to privacy related terms. Ser-
vice providers record and analyze user behavior for their own financial support,
which is achieved mostly by targeted advertising. Users, who are aware of these
practices may want to protect their personal data, sell them for a satisfactory
price, or just wonder whether “free” services are a fair compensation.
Most “free” services are advertisement supported. The less digitally literate
user is under the impression that a possible service subscription is avoided by
consenting to the occasional addition of random advertisements to the service.
However, more the literate user knows that advertisements are targeted, their
selection being based on the user’s recorded behavior during interaction with the
service or with other services, which sometimes are offered by other providers.
Effectively it is the value of user’s personal data that somehow balances a pos-
sible service subscription. Service subscriptions are not expected to exceed a
few dollars per month. Popular paid services, with which a user could make
comparisons, are in the order of magnitude of $10; known examples are Netflix
and Spotify. Social media typically avoid the subscription model, thus no direct
comparisons can be made, but the users’ expectations would probably be in the
same order of magnitude. Effectively, a user’s personal data are exchanged with
services that are worth a few dollars.
This fact creates in the user’s mind the impression that privacy itself is of
low value. We shall see later that field research confirms this impression. On the
other hand Google and Facebook have continuously expanded their percentage
in the technology sector stock market by squeezing the share of more traditional
technology giants as IBM, Microsoft, Cisco and Apple [eco]. Apparently, gigan-
tic amounts of monetary value are produced by offering “free” search and social
networking services, entailing to a considerable extent privacy engineering. Fur-
thermore, a flourishing (albeit quietly working) personal data brokerage market
exists. Effectively there seems to be a remarkably wide gap between (i) the
value attributed to personal data by the data originators, who give the data for
free and (ii) the revenues created by the aforementioned and other companies
and organizations by using these data. The data using entities are effectively
“machines” that convert personal and other data into unprecedented profits.
Of course this is not the first time that information is monetized. However,
personal information is not exactly like any other type of information. Do the
aforementioned considerations imply that service users (who sell privacy data
low) are unfairly treated by service providers (who achieve high profits)? In
some cases, as in YouTube, the company declares the exact amount of money
that goes back to users as content creators, but social media users are not in a
position to assess the balance between the profits of the social network provider
and the value of the services offered to them.
2
3 Personal data value estimation approaches
3.1 Market based approach
The price of a product or service is usually determined by a market, and value
estimates are not independent of markets. Ideally we would find the value and
price of a personal data set in a market. However, such a market between data
creators and data users rarely exists. Suppose that I install in my computer a
data logging software that records certain actions of mine and I decide to sell
the log of one month; there is no market for such a transaction. Conversely,
suppose that a company is willing to access my recorded behavior in a series of
specific transactions on a given service interface. They could make me an offer
for this data set, which has been created by the interaction of their service with
me, but they invariably ask for my consent to allow them to receive this data
stream for free.
In certain situations I could infer the profits of a company by using my
personal data from existing options. For example Spotify offers ad free mu-
sic streaming for e5-14 per month (depending on the country). Alternatively,
a free service is offered with ads, and weaker sequencing control of songs on
mobile phones. Effectively Spotify quits inserting advertisements and (maybe)
collecting my data for the above price. Although the pricing is certain to take
into account the expected balance between paying and non-paying customers,
the aforementioned price remains a strong indication of the personal data value.
On the other hand Wolfram, whose highly sophisticated product Mathematica
is priced in the thousands of dollars, is probably not concerned with user data.
There is yet another missing factor, namely the customer’s quantified will-
ingness to pay for a service, i.e. the service value as estimated by the customer.
Suppose that a social network user is offered a no-ads - no-tracking option for
a paid subscription. How much would the average user be willing to pay for
such an option? Most probably, taking into account the aforementioned price
of subscriptions of streaming, gaming etc. services, a realistic price for social
networking services is in the range $5− 20.
Yet another privacy value indication is likely to appear soon by Google,
which has declared an intention to allow content publishers to charge for the
content in the presence of ad blockers [Ram17]. While this looks like a non-
disturbance buy price, it will become a service sell price if publishers set the
prices according to a content valuation scheme. Alternatively, they may try to
set a price that will offset the loss due to ad blockers, or to set a more or less
flat “fine” that will deter blocker usage. Notice that these are quite different
valuation methodologies, and that some of them may lead to irrational effects.
Consider the following example: You start a video on a website, but before it
starts an advertisement tries to pop up. If it is blocked, a window appears that
asks for a payment. While you would expect the price to somehow reflect the
value of the content, if it is just an offset to the expected advertisement gain
(or even worse if it is a flat “fine”), the connection between the real content
value and the price that appears on the window is lost (due to the possibility to
insert an ad before the video). The only connection that remains is that a more
efficient advertisement is likely to appear together with a more highly valued
video.
In view of the haziness in today’s landscape, some researchers have proposed
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clearer arrangements. Perhaps we should pay a small amount each time we
receive a service, and the service provider should pay us for our personal data
sets or should return to us a part of their profits [BS03]. However, we shall not
consider this category of models in this paper.
While in practice there is hardly a market to sell your own personal data,
there is definitely a market for resellers of your data packed together with the
data of millions of others. Despite the numerous personal and sensitive data
protection laws there is a market for personal data, brokers exist, buyers also
exist and, obviously, there are initial sellers that harvest the data in the first
place and sell them to the brokers, unless we assume that all data offered by
resellers are products of security breaches. According to Pasquale [Pas14] per-
sonal data markets were already a $156-billion-a-year industry in 2014 in US,
but the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) could find neither the data sources
nor the final consumers. Not only the data are sold in a black underground
market, but they are also often used for unlawful purposes.
In 2014 in a report of FTC [ftc14] the results of exploring the behavior of nine
data brokers are outlined: The data are collected without consumers’ knowledge;
brokers buy data from different sources and exchange data with each other; the
population coverage is almost complete and extensive per person; the data are
analyzed and potentially sensitive inferences are made.
However the differential value of additional data is likely to be strongly
decreasing. Kosinski says that about 300 Likes on Facebook are enough to
predict sensitive undisclosed traits of a person with an accuracy close to 100%
[YKS15]. Therefore the next few Likes will add nothing to a person’s already
complete picture. Since data brokers exchange, mix, and improve datasets,
everybody’s permanent picture will be complete in short time and additional
data will add zero information.
3.2 Indirect privacy value estimations
Unfortunately, the informational privacy bears on other types of privacy, i.e. on
accessibility and on decisional privacy ([Tav11], see also section 1). For some
people a misuse of their personal data violates their abstract notion of privacy,
to which they attribute value without being willing to take steps to further elab-
orate on specific and concrete problems that are created or may be created by
the aforementioned misuse. Persons of this type may be reluctant to join social
networks and may provide minimum personal information to online shopping
sites; thus they are not willing to contribute to the creation and circulation of
personal data. Perhaps their behavior provides an indication that the value
they attribute to privacy is higher than average. Is it possible to find out how
these persons valuate their privacy?
According to Marion Fourcade if people mobilize and defend certain “things,”
then these things must have value, even if they are not readily tradable or they
do not appear in markets. Moreover, the trade-offs that people make to pursue
them are a good enough indication of the monetary value they implicitly attach
to them [Fou11]. Fourcade gives an example of value estimation: What is the
value of a pristine albeit difficult to access beach? It is higher than the value
of our usual beach at least by an amount of money v, which is equal to the
additional cost to travel to the better beach. The maximum such differential
amount (paid by the most remote travelers) will give the additional value.
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For example, if the average person in a given social environment is a member
of certain social networks, and uses a number of other services, which extract
personal data, and if we somehow calculate the value of all these social network-
ing and other services to an amount V, then an abstainer that lives in the same
environment values his or her privacy more than V.
We might be tempted to use this methodology in order to calculate a value
for our personal data despite the fact that we do not intend to sell them. One
might say that the value of our personal data is equal to the maximum amount
of money we are willing to pay for their protection. However, the situation is
similar to an insurance related decision. The amount of money that we are
willing to pay for the insurance of a house is not equal to the value of the house,
but is rather in the order of magnitude of the house value times the probability
that it will be destroyed. Therefore in order to use this methodology we would
have to know both possible damages and associated probabilities. Actually this
brings us closer to the damage base approach, which we analyze in one of the
forthcoming sections.
3.3 Subjective valuation
As a matter of fact privacy champions are few, while the personal data of the
majority of the population are open to being harvested. There has been several
studies that try to assess the value of personal data as estimated by their own
producers, i.e. the persons involved in their creation.
Carrascal et al have conducted a study with an aim to estimate the value
that users attached to their own personal data [CRE+13] in 2013 in Spain. Users
of online services were paid for their personal data according to a reverse second
price auction. The study has found that users valued certain “identity” data
about themselves (i.e. age, gender, address, economic status, thus permanent
data) at about e25, while they were willing to give away data collected during
their browsing activity for only e7. They could also “sell” their photos to social
networks for e12 and to search service providers for e2. Effectively, they valued
their personal information at about a few tens of US dollars, often much less.
In 2012 Beresford et al [BKP12] have conducted a field experiment, in which
they sold two similar DVDs online, but they offered the second DVD for a
somewhat reduced price (e1 cheaper) while asking for the buyer’s personal
details. They found that almost all users chose the cheaper product. When
they set equal prices to both DVDs, buyers bought almost equal quantities,
hence the title of their article “unwillingness to pay for privacy.”
A meta-study created by Baruh et al [BSC17], i.e. a study that combines
results from several previous studies, has concluded the following: (a) Users with
enhanced privacy concerns are less likely to use online services, with the marked
exception of social media (see next paragraph). (b) Concerned users share less
information and adopt more privacy protective measures. (c) However, digitally
literate users tend to feel more comfortable with using online services.
In another established trend in field studies, users of social media [BSC17]
are less concerned about privacy. They express personal opinions and upload
content in public. The reduced privacy “paradox” that is associated with so-
cial media can be attributed mainly to self-fulfillment and self-promotion traits.
However the fact that users tolerate the harvesting of their behavioral and other
data by the social network provider can also be attributed to the effectively mo-
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nopolistic nature of social media like Facebook or Instagram. The third person
bias has been offered as yet another explanatory argument by [CPN]: Users tend
to believe that the risks will only materialize on others.
3.4 The damage based approach
Damage based methodologies are popular in courts for the calculation of com-
pensations, but they can also be used in a more general context. When a
person’s data end up in somebody else’s possession, any control over their usage
is lost. Given today’s landscape, in which data are legally and illegally collected,
sold, resold, intercepted, etc., and further used in uncontrolled and unforeseen
ways, the damage that may result is extremely difficult to predict. Even past
damages are difficult to assess.
To the uncertainty in data dissemination one should in the near future add
increased dangers due to smart objects. A person’s medical record leakage could
in the past have led to a rejection of a job application, but tomorrow the same
knowledge combined with a hack of this person’s smart medication tracking
system may end up in a murder.
Anyhow, the value of data is often assessed by making reference to possible
damage resulting by leakage, according to different scenarios and probabilities.
A more general damage and compensation approach can also be applied. For
example, if targeted ads take an hour of one’s time when using a social network
app, the value of the resulting disturbance could be set equal to one hour’s
average payment. As an example, suppose that a “free” audio streaming service
inserts one 2 minute ad every 10 minutes. If a person is likely to use the service
5 hours per month, and if her hourly wage is $8, then her monthly annoyance
is equivalent to 2
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× 8 × 5 = 8 $. If the streaming service is priced to $7 per
month, both options are roughly equivalent.
However, damage calculations are less convenient (a) when the damage is
totally subjective, e.g. when she feels uncomfortable with her neighbors if they
know her medical history, (b) when the harm is done without the person’s knowl-
edge [Lan16], (c) when the damage cannot be easily quantified, (d) when the
harm is done at a later time, and (e) when calculation is simply too complex.
Consider the scenario implied by articles [GK17, AH17], i.e. alleged manipula-
tion of voters in general elections by exploiting personal data harvested by social
networks. Possible damages extend over an entire population, are extremely dif-
ficult to calculate, and sufficient information may not be available before several
decades. Last but not least in the same example, the damage could be purely
ethical: Are we willing to bend the democracy rules, even if the data have been
exploited by the ideal candidate? The utilitarian answer to ethical, environ-
mental and other intangible criteria is that the gain/loss calculation should be
applied over a sufficiently broad context, i.e. given enough time and space, but
this again ends up with a very complex calculation.
3.5 The revenues approach
In 2008 Enders et al. [EHDM08] surveyed a number of social networking sites
and explored their revenue models. The top 5 sites were MySpace, Classmates,
Orkut, Friendster and Spoke, with 130, 40, 37, 36, and 35 million users respec-
tively. Facebook users were only 13 million at the time (now more than two
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billion). All of them relied on advertising, while Classmates used subscriptions
too. Nine years later (in June 2017) the top five sites were Facebook, YouTube,
Instagram, Twitter, and Reddit with 1940, 1000, 700, 313, and 250 million users
respectively [Kal17]. The videos of YouTube (which is owned by Google) are
accompanied by advertisements, but 55% of the revenues are returned to video
creators through the YouTube Partner Program. Effectively the YouTube model
relies heavily on user creativity. Instagram also relies on advertisement since
its acquisition by Facebook (2012). Twitter makes money through direct ads
and by encouraging people to tweet about a brand for a reward. Reddit uses a
complicated mixed model that relies on community support, advertisement and
subscriptions. Reddit claims that it does not track users.
The total revenue from advertisement that was gained by social networks in
2016 was about $33 billion. Facebook’s share was about 2/3 of the 33 billion.
In 2017 Facebook alone is expected to reach 33 billion [Bak, Buy]. Facebook’s
average revenue per user (ARPU) was $4.23 in the first quarter of 2017 [Bal,
Sta17]. A linear projection would give an annual ARPU of $17, but until the
end of 2017 it will probably reach $20. This is significant progress from an
ARPU of around $2 in 2009, and a significant growth since last year. About
half of these revenues come from the mobile app.
What is the total value that a user brings to Facebook? If we calculate
the total revenues during the so far life of Facebook, these are close to $80
billion, but they have been accumulated by a changing size of population. If
we sum up the yearly ARPU in the last ten years, the result is about $52; this
is approximately the revenue brought by a ten year “old” Facebook member.
However, a person’s value for a social network is not equal to the value of the
corresponding personal data. A social network makes money even from the mere
membership of an otherwise inactive member, due to the network externalities
phenomenon. Size counts for social networks.
3.6 Taking into account the market value of vendors
As we have said before, Google and Facebook have recently dominated the tech-
nology sector. However, Facebook is not a capital intensive company. Facebook
owned network equipment equal to $3.63 billion in 2015 [Dat15]. If the current
population is taken into account we could estimate the current equipment to
4.5 billion. Of course Facebook needs more than servers, which reside in huge
data centers (or server farms).
However, the company’s value in the stock market (market capitalization) is
around $336 billion. Effectively, the per user current value of Facebook is equal
to 336/2 = $168. Even if we subtract a 10% for “hardware” (that includes the
real estate) and operating costs, we can estimate the intangible per user value
of Facebook around $150. Which part of this amount could be attributed to
users’ personal data is for further discussion. One might further argue that
market capitalization includes certain intangible factors too, e.g. shareholders’
expectations for the future of a company. Anyhow, the amount of $150 should
be seen as a (perhaps not so tight) upper bound on the current user data value.
Note that Facebook’s capitalization value is approximately equal to its val-
uation over a four year period, assuming that the valuation includes existing
assets and future earning over a given time period. Such a valuation is usual
when a company is about to enter the stock market.
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4 Privacy in social media
In this section we explore the special relationship between privacy and social
media. Online social networking plays an exceptional role both in gathering data
and in using data for producing revenues. Members willingly disclose personal
and often sensitive information for the sake of participation and belonging.
4.1 The privileged relationship between social networking
and personal data collection
Privacy was unknown in traditional societies. Cohesion was an effective de-
fensive weapon of small communities. A sharp division between us and them
existed [Dia13]. Modern cities brought privacy, but also dismantled community
ties. Social networks capitalize on such problems by partly restoring ties. Peo-
ple effectively turn to the services of Facebook, LinkedIn, Google+, Instagram,
Foursquare etc. and willingly reveal personal details, even secrets. However,
the total online behavior of service users is recorded. Personal data streams
are generated, collected, sold, resold, exchanged, combined, and processed. Not
only are the social media the best place to collect personal data, but any privacy
concerns are also neglected by their users [CPN].
In addition, the results and conclusions that are generated are not limited
to the obvious. Sky is the limit to the science of information processing and
inference making. According to [KSG13, YKS15] sensitive private traits can be
uncovered by examining a number of Likes on Facebook. Such powerful tools
could open new prospects to marketers, extortionists, political parties, religious
parties etc. Allegations for political manipulation have already appeared in the
press [GK17].
4.2 The major revenue models
Is personal data harvesting the only means of financially supporting a social
networking service? In fact the known revenue tools in the area of social net-
working are (a) advertising, (b) subscription, and (c) transaction models, which
involve transaction fees, and sales of products and/or services. The latter can be
generated by the network provider, by a third party, or by users. Both (a) and
(c) require a critical mass of users [EHDM08]. There is often a prevalent tool,
which accounts for the greatest part of the revenues and defines the character
of the network. A user’s reaction to a subscription is different from a reaction
to an one time fee. Service providers prefer longer time relationships with users,
i.e. subscriptions.
There is discussion and criticism on the tendency of users towards “free”
services and on the resulting implications on the world of Internet. However,
the preference of service providers for subscription schemes (in telephony, in
press, in magazines, in clubs etc.) has also played an important role, since
they have taught the customer base that there is nothing between a free service
and a monthly subscription service. Today’s service management tools could
possibly enable very short term subscriptions or even a fee per single transaction.
For example, why should I be tied to a specific mobile telephony and data
provider? Why can’t I have an account with multiple (or all) providers and
choose the best service on a transaction basis? Service providers dislike any
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increase in competition that will suppress prices, but customers should be more
active in demanding alternative arrangements. There are indications of change.
Streaming content providers now offer subscriptions with a “cancel anytime”
option.
4.3 The role of network externalities
In social networking an already grown social network will attract more new users
than a young one, since the existing user base largely determines the networking
opportunities of new users. This phenomenon is known as network externalities
or network effects [SV98]. In 2014 Ello was created as an ad-free alternative
to existing social networks. In the beginning they used an invitation policy
and they gathered some momentum. However, it soon became clear to new
members that their friends stayed back in the traditional large and ad infested
social networks; the momentum was lost. Today Ello is not really a Facebook
competitor but rather a specialized artists’ network.
By promoting a “free” social networking service model, Facebook and other
networks are able to better exploit network externalities and get rid of com-
petition in a possible market of different social networking services differently
priced. Of course creating a “free” service by using advertisement is not new,
as it has extendedly been used for decades by traditional TV networks, and it is
now used by the “free press.” The novelty lies in the extensive usage of personal
data.
Consider a world of social networking sites that use a paid subscription
model. A newcomer in this market would perhaps offer a free trial period, while
waiting for the first generation of subscribers. Old established networks could
charge more due to their increased user populations. In fact they would probably
consider an optimized policy that would take into account the increase of the
population in the total revenue.
4.4 Privacy policies in social networks
Social networks are huge personal data collectors. Members willingly provide in-
formation hoping that in this manner they will improve their chances to network
themselves with past or future friends.
A privacy policy is implemented by using rules, which are described in a
document, but they must also be publicly accessible on a webpage and they
must be written in easy to understand language. Since Facebook is the most
often quoted example of information collecting and sharing network, we take
some time to review their current privacy policy (June 2017). They state that
they track their users from what they themselves write or upload, and from
what other users write or upload. They say that they use this information to
show their users targeted ads. They share user information within the Facebook
family of companies, and they transfer information to third parties that support
Facebook’s operations by measuring the effectiveness of ads. They also give
anonymized data to academic researchers. Apparently, this privacy policy does
not allow Facebook to sell data to third parties. Terms change from time to
time in directions of reduced or increased privacy, trying to accommodate new
interests or to make corrections after user protests. There is also a set of privacy
settings, which allow for some user customization. However, Fuchs [Fuc12]
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observes that privacy settings are available and work only against other users,
not against advertisers.
5 Other considerations
5.1 Upper bounds on value
Even if a value for personal data could be determined by complex market mech-
anisms or other methodologies, certain external bounds are also applicable. For
example, no food seller can expect to gain from me by analyzing my recorded
behavior more than the amount of money I spend for food in a given time pe-
riod. Effectively, the value of my (food related) personal data would rather be
a reasonably small percentage of my total food expenses.
As a further example, consider the usage of social networking data in elec-
tions, in the spirit of the article of Grassegger and Krogerus [GK17]. In this
scenario a political party or their consultants ask for the personal data of a user
of a social network. The network provider sells the data for a price, but a per-
centage goes as a payment to the person that owns the data and has approved
the exchange. Again, it is difficult to determine a value for such an item, as it
depends, among other factors, on the probability that the data will finally be
converted to a favorable vote. And even if a vote does materialize, how critical
is this vote for winning the election? Note also that there may exist alternative
means towards the same end, and these alternatives imply price limits. For ex-
ample, in a corrupt democracy certain politicians will directly buy votes, thus
the vote street price will be an upper bound to the value of the personal data
that may lead to winning a vote.
5.2 Transaction models and and data exchange
Most users would probably answer that in principle they would benefit from
increased privacy protection, despite the fact that in practice they give up too
easily. However Varian [Var02] has given certain examples on how a potential
buyer could improve the effectiveness of an exchange by giving more information
to potential sellers. Assume that a person receives multiple messages from
telecom operator agents trying to sell telephony subscriptions. The fact that
the sales person is not fully aware of the preferences and the statistical profile
of the phone calls of the client creates a discussion that is both annoying and
time consuming. In other words, if the seller knew more about the client, then
she could probably make a more targeted offer or would abstain from making
an offer. In this model, the client is motivated to give up privacy in favor of
both better services and less annoyance.
In fact this argument is not particularly original, as it is used every time we
accept a first party cookie that is used by our service provider in order to serve
us better without having to ask again about our preferences. Since privacy is
the right to be left alone, Varian’s way is to include the lack of annoyance in
privacy.
On the other hand, there are other types of information that we, as buyers,
would not like to share with sellers. For example, we would keep the maxi-
mum price we would be willing to pay for a good secret. Effectively, w.r.t. to
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maximizing our benefit, including privacy aspects, we should be able to distin-
guish between information that we should give for free to the other side and
information that we should keep for ourselves. Note also that the value of the
aforementioned maximum price information is equal to the expected gain (for
the seller) or loss (for the buyer) when this piece of information is used.
6 Conclusions
We number our main conclusions so as to facilitate a possible discussion:
1. There is a rough agreement, at least in the order of magnitude, between
the subjective valuations of personal data and the earnings of large inter-
net companies that monetize these data. For example, Facebook users
might estimate the value of the service they receive, which is balanced by
submitting their personal data, at a few dollars per month. On the other
hand, today’s annual average revenue per user (ARPU) for Facebook is
equal to about $20. A superficial conclusion that could be drawn from
the previous point might be that Facebook could perhaps produce more
revenue by adopting a subscription model. However, it is rather obvious
that a large part of its members would quit, thereby seriously damaging
the network externalities on which Facebook is based.
2. The market capitalization of Facebook, Google, and similar companies,
together with the fact that they are not capital intensive, point towards
a value of more than $100 per user, which however should be seen as
accumulated over the time period of the existence of the company. Thus
this amount is in rough agreement with the previous figures.
3. There is a complex data collecting system of companies and organizations,
which is full of intentional and unintentional holes, as also shown by the
existence of a data brokerage market. The end result of this evolution is
that everybody’s personal data will soon become common knowledge, at
least among service providers, ending up with zero value. This tendency is
reinforced by advances in data mining and reasoning, a glimpse of which
appears in Kosinski’s work [KSG13, YKS15].
4. Social media and search machine service providers have so far had a spe-
cial relationship with personal data in both collection and monetization,
mainly through targeted advertising. However, in view of the dropping
value of the (less volatile part of the) personal data, this sector is likely
to (a) enhance its role as a value extractor in the area of advertising, but
also by expanding towards other areas (e.g. politics), (b) focus on the ex-
traction and exploitation of dynamic data (“where is John Doe, and what
is he doing now?”), and (c) control the dissemination of dynamic personal
data, which will retain their value for a limited amount of time.
5. Needless to say, in this environment the average service user is not only
less capable of protecting his or her own data, but also less likely to receive
any compensation.
6. Any compensations (in the form of free services or payments) are not likely
to be designed to cover probable damage from future data leakage and
11
illegal exploitation. It is very difficult to predict the costs of such damages.
This fact might create new opportunities for insurance companies.
References
[AH17] Berit Anderson and Brett Horvath. The rise of the weaponized ai
propaganda machine. Scout, February, 12, 2017.
[Bak] Dillon Baker. The 6 most important social media trends of 2017.
[Online; accessed 22-June-2017].
[Bal] Anita Balakrishnan. Facebook made about usd 4.23 off your profile
in the first three months of the year. [Online; accessed 21-June-
2017].
[BKP12] Alastair R Beresford, Dorothea Ku¨bler, and So¨ren Preibusch. Un-
willingness to pay for privacy: A field experiment. Economics Let-
ters, 117(1):25–27, 2012.
[BS03] Alastair R Beresford and Frank Stajano. Location privacy in perva-
sive computing. IEEE Pervasive computing, 2(1):46–55, 2003.
[BSC17] Lemi Baruh, Ekin Secinti, and Zeynep Cemalcilar. Online privacy
concerns and privacy management: A meta-analytical review. Jour-
nal of Communication, 67(1):26–53, 2017.
[Buy] Media Buying. Facebook mobile ad revenues to near $30 billion next
year. [Online; accessed 22-June-2017].
[CPN] Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic and Nathalie Nahai. Why we?re so hyp-
ocritical about online privacy. [Online; accessed 8-September-2017].
[CRE+13] Juan Pablo Carrascal, Christopher Riederer, Vijay Erramilli, Mauro
Cherubini, and Rodrigo de Oliveira. Your browsing behavior for a
big mac: Economics of personal information online. In Proceedings
of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web, pages
189–200. ACM, 2013.
[Dat15] Data Center Knowledge. The facebook data center faq, 2015. [On-
line; accessed 14-June-2017].
[Dia13] Jared Diamond. The world until yesterday: What can we learn from
traditional societies? Penguin, 2013.
[eco] Cisco adapts to the rise of cloud computing. The Economist. [Online;
accessed 4-July-2017].
[EHDM08] Albrecht Enders, Harald Hungenberg, Hans-Peter Denker, and Se-
bastian Mauch. The long tail of social networking.: Revenue
models of social networking sites. European Management Journal,
26(3):199–211, 2008.
12
[Fou11] Marion Fourcade. Price and prejudice: on economics, and the en-
chantment/disenchantment of nature. The Worth of Goods, pages
41–62, 2011.
[ftc14] Data brokers: A call for transparency and accountability. Technical
report, Federal Trade Commission, 05 2014.
[Fuc12] Christian Fuchs. The political economy of privacy on facebook. Tele-
vision & New Media, 13(2):139–159, 2012.
[GK17] Hannes Grassegger and Mikael Krogerus. The data that turned the
world upside down, 2017.
[Kal17] Pete Kallas. Top 15 most popular social networking sites and apps,
6 2017. [Online; accessed 15-June-2017].
[KSG13] Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell, and Thore Graepel. Private traits
and attributes are predictable from digital records of human behav-
ior. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(15):5802–
5805, 2013.
[Lan16] Carl Landwehr. Privacy research directions. Commun. ACM,
59(2):29–31, January 2016.
[Pas14] Frank Pasquale. The dark market for personal data. The New York
Times, 16:10–14, 2014.
[Ram17] Sridhar Ramaswamy. Building a better web for everyone, 2017.
[Sta17] Statista. Number of monthly active facebook users worldwide as of
1st quarter 2017 (in millions), 2017. [Online; accessed 14-June-2017].
[SV98] Carl Shapiro and Hal R Varian. Information rules: a strategic guide
to the network economy. Harvard Business Press, 1998.
[Tav11] Herman T Tavani. Ethics and technology: Controversies, questions,
and strategies for ethical computing. John Wiley & Sons, 2011.
[Var02] Hal R Varian. Economic aspects of personal privacy. In Cyber Policy
and Economics in an Internet Age, pages 127–137. Springer, 2002.
[WB90] Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis. The right to privacy. Har-
vard law review, pages 193–220, 1890.
[YKS15] Wu Youyou, Michal Kosinski, and David Stillwell. Computer-
based personality judgments are more accurate than those made
by humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
112(4):1036–1040, 2015.
13
